ABSTRACT Machine-type communications (MTC) in 5G will be mostly realized using low-cost transceivers with a small, discrete set of possible configurations. This is in contrast to more capable devices with software defined radio capabilities that support configurations over a practically continuous domain. We find that existing theoretical work assuming continuous domains cannot be immediately applied to such constrained MTC devices. Therefore, we propose a methodology that guides researchers in the process of developing effective MTC wireless systems with devices that have restricted capabilities. By following the proposed methodology, existing theories can be experimentally evaluated and replicated. We show how this methodology can be applied for developing and evaluating efficient interference mitigation systems on a case study using devices that support only discrete transmit power levels. In this case study, we formulate an interference mitigation problem and a corresponding game-theoretic formalism that can support discrete output power levels. We validated some of the existing results obtained analytically and in simulation and we also found that: 1) in practice, devices have to be penalized stronger than in theory to determine them to select all the available transmit power levels; 2) in practice, for the discrete case of the power allocation algorithm, the convergence speed does not increase exponentially with the number of devices; and 3) the proposed power selection algorithm converges in two to four iterations. Similarly, as in the presented case study, the methodology can be used to adapt and test other resource management solutions in an operating environment with real-world restrictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next generation mobile networks are seen as dense, dynamic wireless networks. In 5G, both human type communications (HTC) and machine type communications (MTC) will be accommodated [1] . These networks will, for instance, support current interactive, multimedia applications on smartphones as well as irrigation systems that are autonomously controlled based on measurements from a grid of soil moisture and temperature sensors. This will be a heterogeneous, high-interference radio environment. To accommodate this novel use of the spectrum, regulators across the world are defining more flexible spectrum allocation policies and new standards [2] .
Devices can share the radio spectrum by being separated in time, space or frequency. However, in crowded urban areas or within highly automatized spaces, many devices need to communicate simultaneously. Since at any time at least one device typically needs to access the spectrum, only separation in space and frequency can provide enough bandwidth for all users. In both of these spectrum sharing strategies, power is a key aspect to efficient spectrum sharing. Lower transmit power in a device decreases its interference area, allowing for more spatial frequency re-use. Similarly, lower gain in transmitters is typically related to lower out-of-channel emissions, reducing the need for guard bands and enabling more individual frequency channels to be used simultaneously in the same frequency band. Efficient transmitter power control has other benefits beyond spectrum sharing as well, for instance decreasing the total device power consumption and thus increasing the life time of battery-powered devices.
Flexible spectrum access is often designed with software defined radio (SDR) in mind. However, the SDR approach is not universal among the end devices today. For instance, in devices designed for mass deployments using MTC, cost and power consumption are important considerations. In this respect, off-the-shelf, hardware-based integrated transceivers commonly have an advantage over an SDR approach. Such devices have a much more constrained, discrete set of configurations that they can support. An example of one such limitation is support for only a limited set of transmit power levels [1] .
An abundant, largely theoretical body of work on mechanisms for efficient wireless resource management through power adjustments for interference mitigation exists both for 3GPP and non-3GPP compliant devices [3] - [7] . However, as we show in the state of the art, most of these were designed for devices with SDR capabilities able to transmit power levels on a continuous scale and were tested in simulation environments [7] using assumptions that may not always hold in practice.
Since effective energy aware radio access for MTC systems, including interference management, is still an open challenge [1] , [8] , [9] , we propose a methodology that guides researchers in the process of developing effective MTC wireless systems with devices that have restricted capabilities in terms of transmission power, frequency selection, etc. The proposed methodology is generic and can be applied to a set of wireless resource allocation problems. As a proof of concept, we show how this methodology can be applied for developing and evaluating efficient interference mitigation systems. By following the proposed methodology, existing theories can be experimentally evaluated and replicated. Such methodology enables reproducible science in the wireless domain, thus helping reverse a major trend in which scientific research papers fail to provide all the details that enable others to reproduce and verify the findings [10] . To the best of our knowledge this is the first such effort in the area.
Besides the proposed methodology, another contribution of the paper is the investigation of the interference mitigation problem for wireless devices that only support discrete transmit power levels. This investigation leads to two incremental contributions: i) the provisioning of an analytical solution that ensures a stable discrete and positive transmit power vector, and ii) the power allocation algorithm that includes implementation and experimental evaluation in addition to numerical evaluation. These contributions provide methodology, analytical framework as well as the tools and building blocks needed to support energy aware, adaptive power allocation for MTC in 5G networks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a selection of related work. Section III details the proposed methodology while the following sections show the steps of the methodology applied to an interference mitigation problem. Section IV presents the problem formulation. Section V introduces the formalism that supports the experimental approach and discusses key theoretical aspects of the proposed approach. The algorithm is presented in Section VI. The experimental set-up is described in Section VII. An extensive analysis of the results is provided in Section VIII. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Gimmler-Dumont and Wehn [11] propose a design methodology that enables developing more efficient and dependable receivers using cross-layer design. Yee [12] proposes a design methodology for highly integrated low-power receivers for wireless communications, while in [13] the authors propose a design methodology for using TCP over wireless links that have a link level error control mechanism. Munir and Gordon-Ross [14] propose a methodology for optimizing wireless sensor networks dynamically using Markov Decision Processes. All these works have a different scope than the one proposed in this paper. Our work is the first of its kind by proposing a methodology for designing efficient power allocation scheme for devices that are capable of transmitting with discrete power levels.
In this paper we also claim some contributions in the interference management use case on which we illustrate the methodology, thus below we provide a summary of related work with respect to those contributions.
A. ON INTERFERENCE MITIGATION
The body of work related to interference mitigation in general is very rich. The proposed algorithms, theorems and frameworks for convergence overwhelmingly consider that the wireless devices using the spectrum are capable of transmitting continuous power levels [3] - [5] , this being devices with SDR capabilities. Sung and Wong, noticing that most real systems only support a discrete set of output powers, which is true for most off-the-shelf transceivers, proposed an algorithm that converges under such practical constraints [15] . This line of work was continued in Leung [16] , where a convergence theorem for a broad class of power control algorithms is provided. Leung also showed that several algorithms including [3] and [15] are convergent under it.
B. ON GAME THEORETICAL POWER CONTROL
A subset of power control mechanisms, including the one proposed by Huang [4] , make use of game theoretical frameworks. Saraydar et al. [17] use a non-cooperative supermodular power allocation game to control uplink power for CDMA networks. Lee et al. [18] showed that traditional backoff-based random-access MAC protocols actually translate to a non cooperative game. Others showed similar game theoretic behaviors happening at other layers of the protocol stack including TCP behaving as a cooperative game. Chiang [19] also used game theoretic models to study the effects of power control on source rate regulation through end to end congestion control. It appears that game theory plays an increasingly important role in modeling and developing better MAC algorithms.
1) ON CHANNEL ASSUMPTIONS FOR POWER CONTROL ALGORITHMS
A common assumption in related work is that the channel is static during the adaptation of the power control algorithms. However, it has been recently shown in empirical studies [20] , [21] that this is not the case. Many of the previously proposed algorithms require as input a target or minimal SINR threshold that should be ensured, thus not providing full adaptation to dynamic channel and dynamic network topology where transmitters appear and disappear. For instance, Foschini [3] and Sung [15] require a predefined threshold SINR, Fang [5] requires a logarithmic function of the SINR while Huang [4] requires a set of prices corresponding to each Tx − Rx pair that may be changed during the game, but their importance is not updated when the channel conditions change, thus losing the initial meaning (more about this is discussed later in Section V-C).
2) ON THE CONVERGENCE OF POWER CONTROL ALGORITHMS
Fang et al. [5] adapted Huang's algorithm to body area networks by introducing a convergence criterion that depends on the channel gains and the number of players. This criterion actually does not influence convergence so much, rather it ensures that when the algorithm converges, the data rates of the users are satisfactory. Anton et al. [21] adapted Fang's framework to a real-world testbed with discrete power levels and empirically showed the convergence of the PAPU algorithm [5] . This work also revealed the fact that for many practical cases, Fang's convergence criterion is far too restrictive and it is hard to find real topologies of players that would satisfy it.
3) ON THE PRICING IN POWER CONTROL ALGORITHMS
Saraydar et al. [17] use, in their proposed non-cooperative game, a pricing mechanism that has the role of reducing interference. The cost in their game is adapted by the base station for all users of a CDMA cellular network. Kazemi et al. [22] propose two non-linear cost adaptive schemes for their power allocation game that takes into account battery limitations and direct gains. While the first work assumes a centralized topology, the second is suitable for distributed topologies and both assume devices supporting continuous power levels and perform simulation based evaluations. Neither of the two works scales the cost for an upper and lower power level supported by a target platform and neither use the adaptation of the cost to ensure convergence.
C. THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN OUR GAME THEORETICAL INTERFERENCE MITIGATION CASE STUDY
Our work is different and original from the available literature in the following ways: We use a dynamically adaptive cost that is sensitive to channel changes and keeps its relative importance in dynamic environments, which also ensures that the system will reach a stable state with respect to discrete power transmission (i.e. will converge). Costs are independently adapted by each player (Tx − Rx pair) for maximizing its own utility. Based on existing continuous supermodular game theoretic power allocation techniques we introduce a new technique that is suitable for everyday systems that support discrete transmit powers. Compared to existing formalisms for continuous domains, ours does not oscillate when applied to constrained devices that only support discrete power levels. For the resulting technique, we achieve convergence in the discrete cases using adaptive costs rather than a target interference measure and show that the resulting algorithm is canonical. The implementation of the algorithm is guaranteed to converge at all times on the discrete scenario and we also prove this empirically by extensive experiments.
III. METHODOLOGY
The proposed methodology for developing effective MTC wireless systems using devices that have restricted capabilities such as discrete, rather than continuous transmission power levels has six steps and is represented in Figure 1 .
STEP 1: FORMULATE THE DISCRETE PROBLEM
In the first step, the problem that requires a discrete solution has to be formulated. In the case of MTC devices, most of these only support non-SDR transceivers. Limitations that must be considered are for example discretized power levels, bit rates, transmit and receive frequencies, etc.
In this step, one has to clearly identify the problem to solve, formulate it and explain why the continuous solution is not sufficient. In this paper, we use an interference mitigation problem defined in Section IV.
STEP 2: DEVELOP THE THEORETICAL FORMALISM
In the second step, a literature survey is required to identify an existing theoretical formalism suitable for solving the problem. This is useful to avoid redoing work that has already been done. If such theoretical formalism exists, the step can be skipped. If a more generalized formalism exists, then it should be adapted to the specific problem. Finally, if nothing can be found, a new formalism should be developed.
In the selected interference mitigation example, we adapt existing continuous formalisms to discrete time domain as described in Section V. 
STEP 3: DESIGN THE ALGORITHM
In the third step, the algorithm that follows the formalisms from the previous step has to be developed. If a formalism and an algorithm have already been found in the previous step, then also this step can be skipped. If not, existing algorithms can be adapted or new algorithms developed.
In the selected interference mitigation example, we propose an algorithm suitable for the adapted theoretical framework as discussed in Section VI.
STEP 4: DEFINE THE EVALUATION CRITERIA
In the fourth step, the evaluation criteria to be used for the experimental set-up have to be defined. This step has to consider two main aspects.
First, one has to use criteria that are typically used in the theoretical studies for the domain under discussion. This way, experimental results can be compared against and possibly validate theoretical results. For instance, for a spectrum scanner, the sensitivity to noise should be evaluated.
Second, if necessary, one should add criteria that are specific to the experimental evaluation. For instance, algorithm speed and memory usage might be additional criteria in the implementation of a spectrum sensing method.
In the selected interference mitigation example, we evaluate criteria used in the game theoretic community in Sections VI-C, VIII-B, VIII-C, VIII-D and VIII-E.
STEP 5: DEFINE THE EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
In the fifth step, the experimental set-up suitable for evaluation has to be defined. This includes the type of hardware, the location, the required software modules, the interaction between components, etc. This step has to be thoroughly described and all the information has to be included in the reports so anyone from the community can accurately reproduce the experiment. In the selected interference mitigation example, we evaluate the performance of the designed algorithm using low cost hardware in indoor and outdoor conditions as described in Section VII.
STEP 6: PERFORM THE EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In the sixth step of the proposed methodology, the experiments are performed and the results are collected, analyzed, presented and explained. The theoretical formalism and algorithms developed for solving the problem are evaluated against the criteria in the well defined experimental setup and conclusions are drawn.
This step represents the result of the process and should answer questions such as: Did the results comply to existing or newly proposed theoretical formalism? Which of the considered methods or algorithms performed better? etc.
In the selected example, Section VIII presents the results of the discrete power interference mitigation experiments. 
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We assume a scenario with MTC devices where the placement of the transmitters and receivers is typically predetermined by building/city layout and cannot be changed. Additionally, their effective coverage areas often overlap thus causing mutual interference. For instance, in Figure 2 , Tx 2 causes interference for Tx 1 and Tx 3 ; Tx 1 only causes interference to Tx 2 but not to Tx 3 . Since the transmitter has to successfully deliver data to the receiver, the proposed framework has to ensure that the useful signal received by the receiver along with unwanted signals (interference) and noise is strong enough in order to be successfully decoded. More formally, the signal-to-noise-and-interference ratio (SINR i ) at Tx i should be above a given threshold value. SINR i is given by the useful signal divided by the interference plus noise at Rx i :
where S i represents the signal received from transmitter i, I i represents the unwanted signal received by Rx i from all other transmitters, and σ i is the received noise. This measure is a fundamental one and widely used in interference mitigation techniques. The MTC devices are expected to ensure the required data rates while transmitting at low power levels. One rationale for this constraint is energy efficiency in case of battery powered devices. Another reason is to reduce interference to other devices. A way to enforce power efficiency is to introduce a decentralized mechanism that penalizes transmitters that use high power. Finally, since most of the low cost wireless devices available on the market make use of discrete power transmission levels, this constraint has to be accounted for in the final system model.
V. THEORETICAL APPROACH
Since we consider discrete transmit power MTC devices interacting in a given environment (space, time, frequency) and we are looking at the interference problem, an important question is how efficient are these devices in given scenarios. We may notice that, while sharing common resources, the operation (or gain) of one device is affected by the actions of all the other active devices in the area. This type of interaction is called strategic interaction and it lends itself well to game theoretical modeling and analysis. The key aspects of such an analysis are discussed below.
A. A GAME THEORETIC FORMALISM
A mathematical formalism that models our problem is devised by using game theoretic tools that are suitable for modeling channel access techniques as shown for instance in [18] . Given a wireless network of n transmit-receive pairs (Tx i -Rx i ), where a ''pair'' is referred to as a ''player'' and is formed of two different MTC devices that communicate to each other, the objective is to find stable points of power allocation for each player (pair of MTC devices) such that the players' global utility is maximum while the cumulated power levels are kept to a minimum.
This can be formalized as follows. Given a system
• N is the set of players, or MTC devices, with |N | = n representing the number of players in the set,
• S i is the set of strategies available to player i, i = 1 . . . n (i.e. for a Tx i -Rx i pair in the above scenario, the finite strategy set S i represents the available transmit power levels),
• s i ∈ S i is the strategy of player i (it represents the player's discrete transmit power which is referred to as strategy in game-theoretic terms), 1
.. × S n is the set of all possible situations of the game (the situations are actually possible sets of strategies, or possible power configurations of the devices),
• s ∈ S is a strategy profile of the game (the set of transmit power configurations in an iteration) and
Considering that devices interact in a strategic way, i.e. transmission power of one device affects the transmission power of other devices that share the same spectrum, SINR for player i is best expressed as:
where h ii represents the direct gain, h ij represents the cross gain, p i corresponds to the transmit power of Tx i which is also player i strategy, p j represents the transmit power of Tx j which is also players j strategy, and n 0 is the noise power at Rx i . Figure 3 presents the general scenario tailored for the game theoretic formalism.
FIGURE 3.
General topology for automation scenarios using embedded devices that communicate wirelessly, dependence between players strategies.
The transmission rate of each pair of communicating MTC devices (player) is given by:
where s i , s j are the strategies (transmit power levels) of players i and j, h ii is the direct gain, h ji is the channel gain between transmitter j and receiver i, and n 0 is the noise power. In the high SINR regime, this logarithmic utility approximates the Shannon capacity θlog(1 + SINR) weighted by θ . For low SINR, the rate is approximately linear in SINR [4] . The objectives of the game are to maximize the overall transmission rate and minimize the power consumption and can be achieved by optimizing a utility function:
where c i represents the cost of playing strategy s i , i.e. transmitting with power s i . In this case, the players' strategies S i represent the level of transmit powers that take values in a continuous interval S i = (0, P i,max ), s i ∈ S i [5] . This utility function can easily be decomposed in two different utility functions in order to pursue a two-objective optimization of the power allocation strategies in order to enable more fine grained policies that for instance would prefer a particular region of the resulting Pareto front, however, this is beyond the scope of this paper. If we consider selfish rational players who try to maximize their utility function, then the players will converge to the Nash equilibrium [23] . In this case, the best response for each player is s * = arg max s i u i (s) which represents the solution to the first derivative of (4). Thus the corresponding strategy (Tx power level) is:
Computing the strategies (Tx power levels) according to (5), will always lead to the Nash equilibrium and will, at the same time, penalize players that tend to use maximum transmission power. It can be seen from (5) that when the cost is very high, the first term becomes small and also the value of the resulting strategy decreases. Using this strategy, the ceiling of the transmit power is always limited by the cost. In some cases, when the cost and interference are very high, equation (5) will yield negative strategies which cannot be transmitted by a real device. Thus, the framework has to be designed so that such unfeasible situations are prevented. As one of the contributions of this paper, we prevent the occurrence of negative power levels by adapting the values of c i for changing s j , h ji , h ii , and n 0 as explained later in Section V-C.
B. ON CHANNEL QUALITY AT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The power tuning process guided by the game theoretic formalism has to reach some stable state over a relatively short amount of time, thus converging to an equilibrium. At equilibrium, the strategies of the players (i.e. the transmit power of each transmitter Tx from a pair of communicating MTC devices) must ensure a working channel with an acceptable bit rate. In this section, we derive a condition that, when met, guarantees ahead of playing the actual power allocation game, that at Nash equilibrium, the channel quality will be satisfactory. This condition does not influence the convergence of the game. Rather it prevents activating players (pairs of MTC devices) that would in any case not be able to transmit data between each other.
Assuming a static environment (where players do not move), it is reasonable to consider that h ji is constant for short periods of time. This is not an assumption of the proposed framework and as discussed next in Section V-C and shown in the experimental evaluation, our framework is suitable for dynamic environments. Let us define the maximum distance between the strategy (Tx power) of player i and the Nash equilibrium as the metric d = s = max i | s i |, where s i = s i − s * i is the distance between the current strategy and the Nash equilibrium for player i (i.e. the i − th pair of MTC devices).
The maximum payoff, according to (4) , is obtained for a strategy given by (5) . Because this is a supermodular game [17] , [24] for each player u i (s) has nondecreasing differences, i.e., ∀s −i ≥ s
is nondecreasing, where s −i denotes the strategies of all players except player i. As the game progresses, players' strategies converge to the Nash equilibrium and the distance between the current strategy and the Nash is described by (5)) thus the previous relation can be rewritten as:
Since the game is designed in such way that each iteration moves the strategy space towards the Nash equilibrium, the distance from the current strategy to Nash has to be smaller in consecutive steps, thus the weight of the previous step in formula (6) has to be strictly smaller than 1 resulting in a contraction over (X , d), f : X → X as follows:
When (7) is satisfied, the quality of the channel (i.e. SINR) is good enough to support the communication for all players considered in the game. This condition is less restrictive than the one provided in [5] that limited the feasible sets of players too much, as has been seen in practice [21] . Another alternative for achieving a similar effect, that we might consider in future work, would be to use cross-layer information regarding successfully received packets, rather than just physical layer metrics such as SINR, as discussed in [19] .
C. COST ADAPTATION
The role of the cost is to penalize players (pairs of MTC devices) that transmit with high powers. The first term of the best response (5) is a constant if costs are fixed during the game. These values must be chosen so that s i ∈ [S i,min , S i,max ] which represents the feasible strategies (i.e. power levels) supported by the device. Due to that condition, the cost is bounded by minimum and maximum available transmission powers and equation (5) always yields a positive best response. The cost adaptation also ensures that the framework can accommodate dynamic situations in which channel quality and transmission powers are not stationary. All these are achieved by imposing:
where = h ji s j +n 0 h ii is the total interference for player i divided by the direct gain. According to (8) , the cost of each player depends on the strategies (Tx powers) of the other players (pairs of MTC devices), s j , and on the channel gains (h ii and h ji ). In reality, the gains and transmit powers change in time and, according to (5) , for the same cost, a player gets different best responses at different instances of time.
If the channel quality for a player suddenly becomes excellent but the statically assigned cost was given for a medium quality channel, then this player will become less energy efficient.
In order to keep the relative importance of the initial cost, then the corresponding cost values for each player must be adapted in each iteration in order to reflect changes in transmission power and channel gains, i.e. the cost fluctuates according to the changes in the environment. For instance, a fixed cost value of c i = 3500 will guide players to different strategies in different stages of the game, depending on the values of s j , h ji and h ii . On the other hand, an adaptive cost will always guide the players to the same strategy throughout VOLUME 5, 2017 the game. We have seen the effects of this in our previous work [21] where, for the same cost values, different strategies are obtained.
D. DISCRETE STRATEGIES AND CONVERGENCE
Most of the MTC devices are able to transmit with a set of discrete power levels S i ∈ {s i,1 , s i,2 . . . s i,k }, s i,j < s i,j+1 rather than continuous domain as assumed by the formalism adapted thus far. The formalization for the case of discrete strategies, i.e. transmission powers, must ensure a valid discrete strategy power from the set S i . In this section, we show that the power allocation game is canonical, thus converges and that we achieve the convergence through the cost adaptation mechanism described in Section V-C.
One way to adapt the continuous game to a discrete strategy space is to allow each player to take the nearest strategy from the available discrete set. This means limiting the upper and lower bound of possible strategies, i.e. for strategy s i choose the nearest value between s i and s i . s i is the smallest discrete value that is larger than s i and s i is the largest discrete value that is smaller than s i . For example if the set of discrete powers is S i ∈ {0, 2, 4} and strategy s i = 1.32 then s i = 2 and s i = 0.
As it turns out, this simple modification of the algorithm/game does not assure convergence (see [16] and later in this paper Figure 8 ). The chosen strategies in the discrete domain can oscillate and the game will not converge to a stable state. Leung et al. [16] have proposed a general framework that guarantees convergence in case of continuous or discrete transmission power levels. They show that if an algorithm is canonical, then its convergence is guaranteed. An algorithm is canonical if the following three conditions are satisfied: (a) the interference measure is standard; (b) the target region is closed; (c) the update algorithm is bounded and reactive.
1) THE INTERFERENCE MEASURE IS STANDARD
The interference measure considered for the proposed discrete power allocation game is
, where s represents the strategy profile of the game, i.e. the transmission power levels for each player. I i (s) is standard if it is scalable and monotone [16] .
i. Scalability: ∀α > 1, αI (s)−I (αs) > 0. The interference measure considered is scalable, because the following inequality is true:
h ii > 0, h ji s j > 0, n 0 > 0 ii. Monotonicity: Usually when comparing two vectors/sets it is assumed that the comparison is made punctually, elements are compared individually. This is rigorously expressed as: if s ≥ s ≡ s j ≥ s j , ∀j, then I (s) ≥ I (s ) which can then be written as h ji s j ≥ h ji s j and is also true.
2) THE TARGET REGION IS CLOSED a player's strategy must be chosen from [l, u] , where l and u represent the lower and upper bound of the target region, i.e., the desired convergence region. According to [16] , the target region of an algorithm can be defined as [δ −1 γ , δγ ] where γ represents the desired (interference) threshold and δ is the multiplicative quantization step of the discrete powers.
For the power allocation game developed in this paper, the highest value of γ is given by γ = 1 c i and happens under the worst channel conditions when the noise and interference are very high, then the second term in (5) is very small thus the player will transmit with the maximum power allowed by the cost. In other words, a higher interference threshold, γ , is meant to enable higher transmission powers whenever necessary. With the value of γ given by the highest possible transmit power at a given time, the resulting target region is closed. Another sufficient condition for convergence to the target region is u/l ≥ δ 2 . h ii a player strategy is bounded by:
thus bounding the algorithm. An algorithm is considered reactive if users/players are not allowed to stay outside the target region. In the case of our approach this is assured by (5) and (7), players will always chose the strategy that leads to the Nash equilibrium of the game, their strategies will lie in the interval [s i,1 , s i,k ].
VI. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In order to design an interference mitigation algorithm based on the formalism proposed in the previous section and that can also be implemented and evaluated on a real testbed, some practicalities have to be considered and they are described accordingly in subsections VI-B and VI-C. However, we start by describing the proposed algorithm in subsection VI-A.
A. THE INTERFERENCE MITIGATION ALGORITHM
The proposed algorithm is listed in Figure 4 . When the transmitter of the MTC device pair (player) i starts transmitting, i.e. joins the game, or changes its transmission power p i , it generates a power event. A power event is the means by which players (pairs of MTC devices that communicate) announce that they have changed their transmission power and announce this new value to the other players. For the first received power event the device pairs need to measure the environment in order to be able to adapt. Line 3 in Figure 4 represents this initial measuring step in which MTC devices measure h ii , h ji and n 0 at receiving device Rx i . Players that did not generate a power event adapt their respective costs c i cnt , that measures the number of power updates by player i. If a player needs more than β iterations to reach a stable state then it will generate an event that triggers a measuring iteration, lines 6 − 8, that forces players to update their cost to the changes of the environment (h ii and h ji ).
B. TUNING THE TRANSMIT POWER LEVELS
In order to enable a normalized tuning interval for the players' power levels (strategies), we introduce α that is the penalty associated to each player (pair of communicating devices), α i ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}. If α i = 0 then player i has no constraints related to transmission power levels, and according to (5) it will always play (decide to transmit with) the highest value power level (strategy), s i = s i,max , s i,max ∈ S i . If α i = 1 the penalty for transmitting with high power levels is maximum and players will play strategy s i = s i,min , s i,min ∈ S i . The penalty value, α i , associated to each player is translated to a cost value c i that ensures a valid transmission power for Tx i device using:
where
Adapting costs this way ensures that the first term of the best response (see (5) ) has the same meaning through the entire game. The value of cost c i changes in each game iteration (according to game parameters h ii , h ji , s t−1 −i , and n 0 ) but player i receives the same penalty α i . Thus a player will be penalized for transmitting with high power with the same quantity in each game iteration.
C. INTERFERENCE ESTIMATION
In order to compute its transmit power (strategy), a pair or communicating devices (player) uses (5), thus it requires perfect information about the transmit powers (strategies) of the other pairs of communicating devices (players) p j and about channel gains h ji . The evaluations performed in the related work (except [21] ) use theoretical simulations (i.e. no measurements are involved) and continuous values for several parameters including power and gains. However, in a real-world scenario only some, relevant, channel gains influence the current topology. In order to mimic the theoretical simulations we may choose to measure the channel gains sequentially (i.e. by shutting off the links that are not currently measured). For the implementation and validation approach, standard measurements are needed and are more realistic (i.e. all involved players are active at the time of the measurement). Also, standard measurements take less time, as they are performed during operation, without turning off various devices. Faster measurements enable faster convergence of the algorithm.
When the measurements are performed sequentially, each cross gain is measured individually and the sum is computed by each pair of communicating devices (player). In this case, a synchronization mechanism is needed so that when measuring h ji only player j transmits and player i measures the received signal and computes the gain as:
where n 0 represents the noise level, and P rx i and P tx i are the received and transmitted power levels, respectively, for the pair or communicating devices (player) i. Besides requiring synchronization, this approach also takes a lot of time; in a 4-player game (8 communicating devices) 16 measuring steps are required in order to determine h ii and h ji ). In case of the standard measurements, communicating pair (player) i measures while all the other players j, j = 1, ..., N , j = i transmit. The algorithm makes the assumption that all other communicating devices (players) transmit at the same time. In the eventuality that a player does not transmit during a measurement, the algorithm considers that the particular player did not join the game yet and detects it at a later stage. This aspect is discussed and evaluated in Section VIII-E. In a 4-player game (8 devices), 8 measuring steps are required in order to acquire the information needed to compute the new strategies.
Measuring the channel gains at each iteration is very time consuming. In a real set-up using low cost hardware, the actual time spent by the communicating devices playing the power allocation game is considerably smaller than the time it takes to measure game parameters.
In environments and scenarios where it can be proven that the channel changes slowly, the algorithm can be tuned to further reduce the number of measurements thus only measuring each β iterations. In the scenarios considered in this study, there is no need for the players to change their position, thus, in order to reduce the average overall time required by the game, the channel gains h ji and h ii can be considered constant for a number of steps. For instance, for an office scenario where the wireless devices are fixed and relatively close to each other, it can be seen from Figure 5 that the variation in time for 2 pairs of communicating devices (players) is small. From Figure 5(a) , it can be seen that the direct gains are relatively constant while cross gains have a 4dB deviation from the median when people move in the office. However, this does not translate in a variation of transmission power larger than the quantization step. So the algorithm's convergence is not affected. The topology was enforced by the placement of the transmitters and receivers and experiments showed that only cross gains are affected by the movement in the office whereas the direct links are not directly affected. For example, people are not moving between Tx 1 − Rx 1 but there is some movement between Tx 2 − Rx 2 thus direct gains vary in time as can be seen in Figure 5(b) . In an outdoor scenario with highly varying gains as considered in [21] , channel smoothing and estimation techniques can be considered and the number of steps can be tuned to take into consideration the reality.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
The proposed algorithms are evaluated on the LOG-a-TEC 2 [25] real world testbed using low-cost embedded devices foreseen to evolve into non-3GPP segment of the MTC communications in 5G. The proposed algorithm is testbed agnostic and can thus be evaluated on other existing testbeds, however, the implementation is specific to the LOG-a-TEC API and makes use of the already existing spectrum sensing and measurement tools developed for the adaptation of the PAPU algorithm [21] . We perform evaluations both indoors (Figure 6(a) ), in the offices, and outdoors, at locations that surround a small park (Figure 6(b) ).
All the experiments described in this paper were performed using the VESNA devices that form the LOG-a-TEC testbed with the SNE-ISMTV-TI24 extension that features a TI CC2500 transceiver operating in the ISM 2.4GHz band. The options using TV white spaces with the SNE-ISMTV-UHF and ISM 868MHz band with the SNE-ISMTV-TI868 enable a smaller number of players (maximum 2 Tx − Rx pairs) and therefore were not considered. However, we expect similar results in these bands. By using the TI CC2500 transceiver, the set of transmit powers is, according to the specifications from the transceiver's data sheet, The power allocation algorithm designed in Section VI is implemented in Python using the already available tools for the LOG-a-TEC testbed 3 and is publicly available. All the experiments from this paper can be replicated using the software available in the repository and connecting remotely to the testbed.
The LOG-a-TEC JSI cluster was used in an indoor set-up supporting up to four players as depicted in Figure 6 (a) and in an outdoor set-up supporting up to three players as depicted in Figure 6(b) . A player is formed by a pair of 2 wireless devices, a transmitter Tx i and a receiver Rx i devices. The actual values of the direct h ii and cross h ij gains are given in the corresponding section with the results as they depend on the number of players that are considered. During the experiments, the wireless devices do not change their position and all the considered topologies satisfy the convergence condition (7) . This means that even under the maximum interference generated by the other communicating pairs (players) j to communicating pair (player) i, j = 1, ..., n − 1, j = i, will still allow the receiver device Rx i to receive data sent by transmitter device Tx i . For the experiments we consider the thresholds for the measuring event β i = 5 and for reaching a stable state T = 5.
The cost adaptation given by formula (11) , that ensures a valid transmission power for the devices equipped with the TI CC2500 transceivers, becomes:
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Experiments are done on the indoor and outdoor testbed as discussed in Section VII. The analysis of the effect of different parts of the algorithm (such as interference estimation, effect of cost adaptation, convergence speed) is performed mostly on the indoor testbed because of the ease with which the experimental conditions can be changed. Testing whether the algorithm reaches a stable state is done on both testbeds.
A. INTERFERENCE ESTIMATION
As described in VI-C, interference estimation is one of the practicalities that need to be considered when implementing the cost-adaptive power allocation algorithm. A significant difference between theory and practice is revealed when tackling this aspect. Figure 7 presents a comparison between the results obtained with the two measurement approaches identified in Section VI-C, for a 2-player power allocation game. The approach using sequential channel gain measurements, with results depicted in Figure 7 (a), mimics the theoretical assumption that all the cross gains are relevant when implementing the algorithm and should be measured individually. Figure 7 (b) illustrates the more realistic case when standard channel gain measurements are performed during operation, capturing the actual interference environment. In the first case, when each component of the sum j h ji p j in equation (5) is considered, even low values of h ji affect the final transmit power (chosen strategy). For the second case with standard measurements (all j pairs of communicating devices transmit at the same time) lower values of the cross gain are not considered. In this case, the transmit power (strategy) of communicating pair (player) i will be largely influenced by pairs of communicating devices that are physically close to it and transmit with high power (Rx device of player i will not ''sense'' a transmission from low power transmission devices thus it will not be influenced by them). For example, consider the following topology of an indoor 4 player (4 pairs of communicating devices) game, depicted in Figure 6 player 4 will also consider player 1 no matter how small the channel gain h 14 is.
It can be seen that the main difference is in the penalty value which, in order to allow Tx powers (strategies) from the whole domain of possible Tx powers in real-world implementations, needs to be higher than in the theoretical approach, Figure 7 . As the pairs of communicating devices (players) decrease their transmission power they will cause increasingly less interference to each other. Thus in case of standard channel gain measurements a high penalty value, α i = 0.9, will yield a higher strategy (transmission power) for both players than in the case of sequential gain measurements. For transmission powers lower than −15dBm players will not interfere with each other, j h ji p j will be mostly channel noise, and in case of standard channel gain measurements higher penalty values are needed to force pairs of communicating devices (players) to further decrease their transmission power, as it can be seen in the zoom-in plot from Figure 7 (b) for a 2 player game. The penalty values that would, in practice, force the pairs of communicating devices (players) to transmit with lower power levels are higher than those obtained from the theoretical approach. This is further confirmed by evaluations on 2 to 4 pairs of communicating devices (players) as depicted in Tables 1 and 2 . Experiments are performed on the indoor testbed, the topology used is given in Figure 6 (a) and players are defined according to Tables 4, 6, and 8 ensures that communicating pairs (players) are penalized with the same value (α i is the same in all iterations) and that the algorithm is bounded. If the algorithm is not bounded, then it is not canonical and its convergence is not guaranteed.
In order to empirically confirm this, we perform experiments on a 2 communicating pair (player) indoor game on the testbed depicted in Figure 6 (b) with the pairs defined according to Table 3 (left) and the corresponding measured average channel gains Table 3 (right). For the discussion in this section, we refer the ''fixed cost'' game and the ''adaptive cost'' game and plot the corresponding experimental results in Figure 8 (a) and Figure 8(b) respectively. The ''fixed cost'' game whose results are depicted in Figure 8 (a) assumes that the communicating pair's (player's) transmit powers (strategies) take values in a continuous domain and are then rounded to the closest Tx power supported by the device. The value of the cost is constant during the entire game and is set to c i = 0.05, thus line 9 of the proposed algorithm which performs cost adaptation (see Figure  4) is left out. This can lead to sub-optimal strategies, convergence is not guaranteed. It can be seen from the figure that the same cost value yields different strategies in each iteration. For instance, in this particular case, after 26 game iterations, communicating pair 2 chooses as best response strategy a transmit power of −6 dBm. Next game iteration communicating pair 1 adapts and chooses as best response, according to (5) , the strategy −10 dBm. Communicating pair 2 responds by changing its strategy to −4 dBm. This behavior continues, players strategies (transmit powers) oscillate and the game is not convergent. The strategy of communicating pair 1 oscillates between −8 dBm and −12 dBm. This means that, VOLUME 5, 2017 the average transmit power is 10 dBm, however, the link quality and therefore the throughput will vary. Half of the times, the throughput will be high, corresponding to −8 dBm Tx power, while half of the times, the throughput will be lower, corresponding to the −12 dBm Tx power.
Since the quantization step for VESNA is δ = 2 dBm, having an oscillation of 4 dBm in this experiment is relatively small. However, for certain channel gains and device transmission powers other, more extreme, sub-optimal strategies can be obtained, where the variation of the Tx power between consecutive iterations is higher than 10 dBm for each communicating pair. In such scenarios, even though the game is stationary (i.e. strategies vary between the same values), the high variations in Tx power will sometimes lead to very high throughput links half of the times and unusable links in the other half.
The ''adaptive cost'' game whose results are depicted in Figure 8 (b), presents the same scenario with 2 communicating pairs (players) in which cost adaptation is performed through introducing the penalty parameter, α i , associated to each communicating pair as discussed in Section VI-B. The penalty considered in this case is α i = 0.05. It can be seen that, in this case, the power levels converge to stable strategies −8 dBm and −2 dBm in 3 iterations. This behavior is observed in tens of runs of the algorithm and is not subject to coincidence. It can be seen that, compared to the average transmit powers (strategies) of the ''fixed cost'' game, the strategies of the ''adaptive cost'' game lead to higher Tx power. This is indeed slightly less efficient from an energy consumption point of view, however it assures a stable link, rather that one that may be even unusable at times. Our experiments are consistent with theoretical evaluations which suggest that the discrete case is always upper bounded and thus less optimal than the continuous case of a game [6] .
C. REACHING STABLE STATES IN THE N-PLAYER ADAPTIVE-COST GAME
In order to analyze the influence of the penalty value α i on the final strategy leading to a stable state, we experimented on the indoor setup with 2, 3, and 4 communicating pairs or MTC devices (players) and on the outdoor setup with 2 and 3 communicating pairs (players). Due to topology constrains, where the measured gains must satisfy the condition given in (7), the 4-player outdoor power allocation game was not feasible (we will elaborate more on this in the next section). The results are averaged over 20 independent runs for each considered penalty value. The experiments use the cost-adaptive algorithm that is guaranteed to converge and which adapts the costs of each player, at every step, based on p i , h ii and h ji . Tables 4 and 5 present the 2-player setup for indoor and outdoor experiments. The indoor experiments use the same setup as in Section VIII-B. Due to layout changes in the office, the devices have been slightly reallocated thus there is a slight variation between gains h ii and h ji presented in Tables 3 and 4. Tables 6 and 7 present the setup for the 3-player indoor and outdoor experiments. For the indoor experiments communicating pairs (players) 1 and 2 are the same as in the 2 player version of the game. For the 4 communicating pairs (player) scenario, only the indoor experiment is performed, with the first three communicating pairs (players) being the same as in Table 6 ; the fourth communicating pair (player) is made of devices 53 and 57 (Figure 6(a) ). The maximum standard deviation of the measured gains for the indoor case is 2.5 dB. Figure 9 (a) presents the final Tx power levels (strategies) for the 2-player power allocation game for different penalty values for the indoor case. It can be noticed that, for a low penalty, α i = 0, players will play a Nash strategy, s i = 0, that ensures the maximum available transmission power, p i = 0 dBm. As the penalty α i increases, communicating MTC device pairs are penalized for transmitting with high power so they play a Nash strategy that ensures the highest payoff for that specific penalty value. Results obtained for the outdoor case are consistent with those in the indoor case. For the chosen topology from Tables 4, player 2 has a lower direct gain than player 1 and so it can transmit with higher power levels, even though both players have the same penalty α i . Figure 9 (b) presents the final strategies for the 3-player game for a range of penalty values. The experiments and conclusions are the same as in the 2 player version of the game, and players converge to a Nash strategy that assures the highest transmission power for a given penalty α i .
It can also be noticed from Figure 9 and the standard deviation of values presented in Table 1 that the final strategies may differ across runs. In our experiments this happened for α i ∈ {0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.45} for the two player game in Figure 9 (a) and for α i ∈ {0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.4, 0.5} for the three player game in Figure 9 (b). As the final value of the Tx powers (strategies) is determined by the cost and the interference as can be seen from (5), when the level of interference increases, the cost of transmitting with higher power decreases, thus the transmitter will use a higher power level. This can be best observed for α i = 0.1 in Figure 9 (a) where the final Tx power set (strategies) varies according to the channel gains and using the discrete power levels enabled by the experimental platform as discussed in Sections V-D, VI-B and VI-C.
D. ON THE CONVERGENCE SPEED OF THE N-PLAYER GAME WITH ADAPTIVE COST
As discussed in Section VIII-B, for the non-cost adaptive version, the algorithm might not converge and thus oscillate endlessly between two values. However, the cost adaptive version is always guaranteed to converge. This section provides an empirical estimation of how fast the algorithm converges, i.e. in how many steps or iterations. It is also important to evaluate the convergence time in relationship to the time needed for estimating the interference as discussed in Sections VI-C and VIII-A.
In order to assess the convergence speed, we computed the median and standard deviation of the final Tx power level set (strategies) over 20 independent runs for the 2, 3 and 4 pairs of communicating devices (player). Figure 10 presents the Tx power (strategy) evolution for the 2-player game. It can be seen that in iteration 0 the pairs of communicating devices randomly chose a Tx power (strategy) s i from the available Tx power set (strategy pool) P i . As the game progresses, the communicating devices change their Tx power according to (5) . On average, the game converges after 2 iterations and the number of iterations is not dependent of the starting value or of penalty. This is because the algorithm is reactive and performs a very fast adaptation as can be seen in Figure 12 where the dynamics of cost values for each pair of communicating devices (player) at different game iterations is depicted. Depending on the Tx powers (strategies) of the communicating devices, h ii , and h ji , costs are adapted according to (11) and this adaptation mechanisms is fast for a 2-player power allocation game.
The convergence speed, however, increases with the number of pairs of communicating devices (players) as can be seen in Figure 11 where the median and standard deviation of the strategy evolution for 3 pairs of communicating devices (players) over 20 independent runs is presented. It can be observed that for 3 players, the game converges on average after 2−4 iterations. Our experiments showed that the number of steps needed to achieve Nash equilibrium will not increase exponentially or even linearly with the number of players. This convergence speed is fairly constant because of the high difference between consecutive discrete power levels, since TI CC2500 transceiver has a high quantization step. In case of other related work such as [5] the convergence speed increases exponentially because they deal with a continuous domain, whereas we have discrete values with a fairly wide target region.
E. DYNAMIC GAME
In this section, we empirically assess what happens with the wireless system when pairs of communicating devices (players) appear and disappear. As designed, we expect the power allocation game to re-balance, i.e. converge to new strategies, as the system looses balance with the appearance or disappearance of communicating devices. We also expect this re-balance to happen relatively fast in only few iterations as discussed in the previous section. Such situations often occur in reality where there are times when some nodes will have nothing to transmit, thus will temporarily exit the game. Figure 13 presents a power allocation game in which the number of pairs of transmitting devices (players) changes in time. Initially 4 pairs of transmitting devices (players) play the power allocation game, after some iterations devices leave or rejoin the game. Initially, at the start of the game, the communicating devices (players) reach a stable state after 8 iterations and remain in this stable state. At iteration 15, Player 4 leaves the power allocation game. The remaining players need 1 iteration to adapt to the new environment in which Player 4 is not transmitting anymore. In our experiment, the adaptation consisted of Player 1 changing its Tx power (strategy) to transmit with lower power while the other communicating pairs (players) kept playing their former Tx powers (strategies). It seems that Player 4 caused the most interference to Player 1, this is also consistent with the experimental setup depicted in Figure 6 (a) where Players 1 and 4 are closest to each other. The game is then stable for 12 iterations after which Player 4 re-joins the game. It can be seen that the players adapt to the former state in 1 iteration by Player 1 increasing its Tx power. Both Players 2 and 3 transmit with the same Tx power, according to the indoor setup (see Figure 6 (a)) their Rx nodes are not affected by the transmission of players 1 and 4. At iteration 40, Players 4 and 3 leave the game. Players 1 and 2 need 2 iterations to adapt to the new environment, they change their strategies to transmit with lower power. This happens because there is little interference between Players 1 and 2, thus they can transmit with a lower transmission power.
This behavior of the dynamic game is expected and happens because the best response is computed based on channel parameters h ii , h ji , s j , and available strategies take discrete values.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a methodology that guides researchers in the process of developing effective MTC wireless systems with devices that have restricted capabilities. Unlike more powerful devices with software defined radio capabilities, many MTC devices are unable to support continuous domain configurations. Using the proposed methodology, we show how existing theoretical work using assumptions for continuous domains can be adapted for use in MTC devices. Additionally, by following the proposed methodology, existing theories can be experimentally evaluated and replicated.
The proposed methodology is generic and can be applied to a set of wireless resource allocation problems faced with the need to adapt theoretical solutions from continuous space to a setup characterized by restricted capabilities and discrete parameter space typical for MTC systems. As shown in this paper, as a proof of concept, we applied the methodology to interference mitigation through discrete transmit power control. An adaptive-cost, discrete-power allocation game was formalized and the guaranteed convergence to a stable state was demonstrated. A feasible algorithm was formulated based on the proposed formalism. The algorithm is implementable on a real-world set-up provided that consideration is given to tuning the Tx powers (strategies) of the devices and the estimation of the interference which, in practice, are achieved differently than in theory. Our experiments have shown that (i) the penalty value in practical implementations has to be higher than in theoretical studies in order to allow strategies from the entire strategy domain to be selected, (ii) the proposed cost adaptation is able to achieve convergence, (iii) stable states can be reached, (iv) the stable states adapt to the changes of the channel quality, (v) the algorithm converges in 2 -4 iterations, and (vi) unlike in theory using continuous domain assumptions, in practice, for devices capable of discrete Tx power levels, the convergence speed does not increase exponentially with the number of devices. All experimental results are analyzed and explained by the theoretical sections. The considered case study validates the methodology and its applicability for the adaptation of theoretical solutions from continuous space to a setup characterized by restricted capabilities and discrete parameter space typical for MTC systems.
